



15 Jalal Talabani (leader of the Popular Union of Kurdistan), 1996


refugees who had already fled there. Soon the festering divisions within the KDP led to a major split between the Barzanis – Mulla Mustafa and his sons Idris and Masoud – and Jalal Talabani. The latter broke with the KDP and formed the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), attracting many who had found Barzani's tribal leadership hard to reconcile with their own nationalist and socialist principles. Barzani himself was to die in exile in the United States in 1979.

For Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husain the disintegration of the KDP and the end of the Kurdish revolt was the real prize of the Algiers agreement, making it easier to deflect attention from the fact that they had ceded Iraqi territory to Iran. Baghdad pressed ahead with its plans for the Kurdish region. An appointed assembly began its sessions in Arbil, a Kurd, Taha Muhi al-Din Ma'ruf, was appointed vice-president



16 Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Shi'i *mujtahid* executed in 1980),
c. 1978

the largely Shi'i public housing quarter of Baghdad. Indeed in Madinat al-Thawra the Ba'th's apparatus of surveillance and repression collapsed under the weight of the protests. These events sharpened Saddam Husain's concerns about the hidden power of the Shi'a and about the doubtful reliability of the Ba'th Party in a crisis. Instead he turned to the more trustworthy security services, bringing the streets under control through violence and arresting nearly 5,000 people, including a large number of Shi'i clerics and even some Sunni *'ulama*. Many were executed and some of the most prominent Shi'i clergy were expelled from Iraq. Al-Sadr remained under house arrest, but tapes of his sermons denouncing the regime were circulated to considerable effect throughout Iraq, listened to by Shi'i and Sunni alike.¹⁰



17 President Saddam Husain (president since 1979), 1995

the client followings of the senior members of the regime who had been found guilty of complicity in the 'Syrian plot'. Alternatively, they had simply run foul of the spreading networks of Saddam Husain's influence in some unspecified way.¹¹

SADDAM HUSAIN'S PRESIDENCY AND THE WAR WITH IRAN IN 1980

The widespread purges of the party and the leadership underlined for those who survived the fact that they held their positions on sufferance. Obedience to Saddam Husain and proximity to him were now to be the criteria for promotion and indeed for political – and sometimes actual – survival. Such obedience could bring its own rewards, but it would also mean accepting the leader's judgement on all matters relating to the state, to the Ba'ith and indeed to the fate of any particular individual. Saddam Husain himself, who was forty-two at the time of his elevation to the presidency, had triumphed by using the disconcerting combination of charm, generosity and ruthless terror that was to serve him so well in maintaining his position as ruler of Iraq for longer than any predecessor.

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19 Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i (senior Shi'i cleric until his death in 1992),
c. 1985

led to a string of successes as one town after another fell to the Kurdish forces, culminating in the capture of Kirkuk itself on 19 March. However, this was the high point of the rebellion. Within ten days, Iraqi government forces, led by the units of the Republican Guard, hit back, recapturing Kirkuk, driving into the rebel-held areas and inflicting heavy casualties on the Kurds. Memories of *al-Anfal* and its chemical attacks, as well as rumours of the killings of civilians, led to the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Kurds, fleeing for the relative safety of the borders of Iran and Turkey. Nearly two million people were on the move within the space of a few days, leading to the disintegration of the rebel forces.



20 President Saddam Husain, his wife, sons, daughters and sons-in-law, c. 1989



21 President Husain and family portrayed in the Iraqi magazine *Alif-Ba*, 1996, omitting the two disgraced and murdered sons-in-law

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