empowered to he chose. The tirs and defence egional budget. I would exclude q, including the

ssed ahead with he KDP to co-, led by 'Aziz alwith two small ational alliance. ions, including a common cause government. By lowed a familiar accessible towns, Barzani and the pport. The escay, leading to the nancial reserves. nen certain Shiʻi of that year, the rs were arrested executed.

fighting opened and Iraq, which gotiations began is the dramatic Iraq had agreed Saddam Husain, arm the common in exchange Iran Within days Iran osed the border all within weeks. In and surrendered, it into Iran with a in 150,000 civilian



15 Jalal Talabani (leader of the Popular Union of Kurdistan), 1996

refugees who had already fled there. Soon the festering divisions within the KDP led to a major split between the Barzanis – Mulla Mustafa and his sons Idris and Masoud – and Jalal Talabani. The latter broke with the KDP and formed the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), attracting many who had found Barzani's tribal leadership hard to reconcile with their own nationalist and socialist principles. Barzani himself was to die in exile in the United States in 1979.

For Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husain the disintegration of the KDP and the end of the Kurdish revolt was the real prize of the Algiers agreement, making it easier to deflect attention from the fact that they had ceded Iraqi territory to Iran. Baghdad pressed ahead with its plans for the Kurdish region. An appointed assembly began its sessions in Arbil, a Kurd, Taha Muhi al-Din Maʿruf, was appointed vice-president

es to be seen to

oposed Ba'thist is purge of the aring the winter illusions about to discover the way of rallying upon the Arab. He could thus and their attive explicit during aratory commiterate the process are were marked

more imperative absolute control. ion to the shah ne dissident Shiʻi reed to the shah's n October 1978. gence as leader of ew the shah and its concerns, the nian government. kample on undere took heart from olic symbols of the t the Iraqi governn unnerved by the e emergence of a epression therefore ar organisations.

Chief among these laced under house gime's fears of the massive demonstratist the government, addinat al-Thawra,




16 Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Shiʻi *mujtahid* executed in 1980), c. 1978

the largely Shi'i public housing quarter of Baghdad. Indeed in Madinat al-Thawra the Ba'th's apparatus of surveillance and repression collapsed under the weight of the protests. These events sharpened Saddam Husain's concerns about the hidden power of the Shi'a and about the doubtful reliability of the Ba'th Party in a crisis. Instead he turned to the more trustworthy security services, bringing the streets under control through violence and arresting nearly 5,000 people, including a large number of Shi'i clerics and even some Sunni 'ulama. Many were executed and some of the most prominent Shi'i clergy were expelled from Iraq. Al-Sadr remained under house arrest, but tapes of his sermons denouncing the regime were circulated to considerable effect throughout Iraq, listened to by Shi'i and Sunni alike. 10

onal crisis and the e. Saddam Husain 79 Hasan al-Bakr rs Saddam Husain g one of his most oresident. Saddam ays a formality, but ration showed that position to his peressary in view of nat he had created z al-Asad of Syria ıqi Baʻthists detersummit of power. so – and his physieve he did – is less Husain's leadership

eliminate all those dience. In late July is had uncovered a ria – aimed at tops of the RCC. This ecial convention of RCC member ald details of the plot Husain went on to no were seized and renzy and terror – r and occasionally some of the most

rrested. They were tin's protégé Na'im ding al-Mashhadi, q al-Samarrai who were paid off at the of the party being ey had either been mselves to be overor had belonged to



17 President Saddam Husain (president since 1979), 1995

the client followings of the senior members of the regime who had been found guilty of complicity in the 'Syrian plot'. Alternatively, they had simply run foul of the spreading networks of Saddam Husain's influence in some unspecified way.<sup>11</sup>


## SADDAM HUSAIN'S PRESIDENCY AND THE WAR WITH IRAN IN 1980

The widespread purges of the party and the leadership underlined for those who survived the fact that they held their positions on sufferance. Obedience to Saddam Husain and proximity to him were now to be the criteria for promotion and indeed for political – and sometimes actual – survival. Such obedience could bring its own rewards, but it would also mean accepting the leader's judgement on all matters relating to the state, to the Ba'th and indeed to the fate of any particular individual. Saddam Husain himself, who was forty-two at the time of his elevation to the presidency, had triumphed by using the disconcerting combination of charm, generosity and ruthless terror that was to serve him so well in maintaining his position as ruler of Iraq for longer than any predecessor.

in Iran, sent a few the border to help eserters fleeing the the rebels, a terrided as agents of or fact that the rebels h Abu al-Qasim alof a committee to there was no overall ore, it also became ned to the cities and abitants bided their rominent shaikhs of sert control.

to be no match for ouple of weeks the such a purpose, had g massive loss of life at March the authort for Saddam Husain ,000 refugees poured f others sought sance south in an attempt forces. These exacted wing joined the rebeland seizing thousands ans during the coming

in the south, Saddam that had broken out couraged by the defeat of the southern rebelates local grievances its rule of Kurdistan. P and the PUK, soon b, but it was noticeable of the jahsh, hitherto the in revolt. The strength the government troops



19 Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i (senior Shi'i cleric until his death in 1992), c. 1985

led to a string of successes as one town after another fell to the Kurdish forces, culminating in the capture of Kirkuk itself on 19 March. However, this was the high point of the rebellion. Within ten days, Iraqi government forces, led by the units of the Republican Guard, hit back, recapturing Kirkuk, driving into the rebel-held areas and inflicting heavy casualties on the Kurds. Memories of *al-Anfal* and its chemical attacks, as well as rumours of the killings of civilians, led to the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Kurds, fleeing for the relative safety of the borders of Iran and Turkey. Nearly two million people were on the move within the space of a few days, leading to the disintegration of the rebel forces.



20 President Saddam Husain, his wife, sons, daughters and sons-in-law, c. 1989



21 President Husain and family portrayed in the Iraqi magazine *Alif-Ba*, 1996, omitting the two disgraced and murdered sons-in-law

Husain's of his you elimination

Others to organis munity. T rebellions regime's s works of Saddam ii al-Da<sup>c</sup>wa the formic tried to as centralised security sys ates were had to con viduals of than in the of power.

The clan is based or groups fror and margin and less am – or simply As a conse under the b and the oth tion and rev social disaddesperation tion.

This was the 'oil for for again on the system devise sections of the whole of the patronage ar