e seriously altered by enough to advocate a n jeopardy.

ninous prelude to the ere the events of the y. The Assyrians had o recognise their right l them to think about of the country, if nece Assyrians, the Mar n the talks broke down d alarm among the l to cross into Syria in find sanctuary there. back, detachments of n. Arguments erupted Assyrians were killed. d in Baghdad and the i, commander of the ize of the community, the national integrity sign by Great Britain the country. However long association with uing role in guarding ession. Bakr Sidqi was ished. In August 1933 villagers by the Iraqi ook the opportunity to

d as a great victory for no was promoted and s was a dismal beginowever, it represented tened the unity of the nunity associated with aken to vindicate the by raised its status as dqi thinking about the he state from external ander of the southern



7 King Ghazi (king of Iraq 1933–9), c. 1933

region during the next couple of years, this was a role which he helped to define when faced by successive tribal revolts in the mid-Euphrates.

In the wake of these events, King Faisal's health deteriorated and he left Iraq in September 1933 for medical treatment in Switzerland, dying within a week of his arrival. He was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, a young man of twenty-one who had little interest in the political world, but whose general sympathies were broadly pan-Arab. Like many in Iraq, he also resented British domination. These sentiments drew him closer to the members of the Ikha Party initially, although he eventually formed his own circles of favourites, based on personal likes and dislikes and not much influenced by his late father's choices. However, he showed neither his father's sensitivity to the forces at work in Iraqi society nor his acumen in drawing them into the circles of royal patronage.

REPRESSION

ch emerged the rethe new system to influence the 3. As minister of the armed forces edience. He sucction amongst a different. It was neral public, that a. These younger iscontent of the ation of defeat in the Officers' couptink about organ-

and out acquaination. These men to the premiership, ading between the e younger officers parties and conseofficer corps, prethe armed forces a small group of the group that was id indeed seem to a to military inter-

d scale, mobilising and the censorship hake the hold of a at and Tawfiq alof the regent. The mittently his initiathat King Faisal II ers as head of state owers as regent and the effect, however,



9 Prince 'Abd al-Ilah (regent of Iraq 1939–53; crown prince 1953–8) and King Faisal II (king of Iraq 1939–58), 1953

either on his determination to play a key role in politics or on his ability to do so through the networks of protégés and associates which he had established over the years. The king himself was young and had been brought up under the aegis of 'Abd al-Ilah. He therefore had little political vision and had not had the time or opportunity to develop a political personality of his own. His circle of acquaintances was the same as that of the crown prince and consequently, when Jamil al-Midfa'i offered his resignation in August (partly through disillusionment but also for health reasons), the king consulted the crown prince and Nuri before asking Fadhil al-Jamali to form a government.

Al-Jamali had been associated with a number of the reformist ideas circulating in Iraq during the previous decade. However, he had kept aloof from the political parties, choosing instead to chart an individual course in which he was the centre of a grouping of younger officials and academics thinking about the future of the Iraqi state outside the radical or revolutionary opposition. The bruising experience of having been minister of foreign affairs under Salih Jabr in the government which negotiated the Portsmouth Treaty in 1947 turned his attention back to his earlier interests in domestic reform, with a view to strengthening the



11 President 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif (president 1963–6), with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, c. 1964

five years. 'Abd al-Salam made it clear that he intended to monopolise power, sharing it only with those associates whom he trusted or thought worth placating. Consequently, he remained president and commander in chief of the armed forces, ruling by decree and appointing only military colleagues to the NCRC, of which he now became chairman. He formed the Republican Guard as an elite unit in the armed forces, under the command of one of his kinsmen from the tribe of the al-Jumaila, Colonel Sa'id Slaibi, who also ensured that the territory of the al-Jumaila around al-Ramadi was the principal recruiting ground for the Guard. Well armed and stationed strategically near Baghdad, this unit was intended to guard the regime against future coup attempts.

Unlik strength of civil indeed a armed f 'Arif wa establish popular 1958 and calculati destroy of at least t

Once regime rethose or openly raffiliation aware the cliques value of the mantle temoving obliging

To so pan-Ara 'Arif ad was the also inte Egyptian ular kin Neverth region as for an Ir his initia to the p Arabs, b were mo state. As still an ir themes of the politics themes of the politics lible, as well as its const a radical break with lam Husain has used, cal logic of the system prefigured in previous ways they epitomise a Iraqi state itself, as thad this not been the lant social networks and expectations, its power er the ambitions of its

red for so long the devesponsible for bringing cades. This is not to say of Iraqi history, as he his regime determined efore. Rather, Saddam tions of a particularly — a narrative in which e exemplary use of viosystem of dependence for men at the centre d national destiny. It is constituents of this nart, rather than a number Iraqi politics in the late

IDATION OF POWER

ed them seize power, Salih Mahdi 'Ammash at the expense of the power emerge triumphant. In of the Revolutionary al of the Ba'th Party he osal. He used these to



13 President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (president 1968–79), c. 1970

advantage, especially in the armed forces where he had followers not simply amongst Ba'thists, but also in the officer corps more generally. Hasan al-Bakr was in many ways a typical regimental officer, solicitous of the welfare of his subordinates and able to use the language of military collegiality to create a certain bond with fellow officers. Despite the radical Ba'thist rhetoric that he used when occasion demanded, his views were conservative and rather typical of his provincial background: pan-Arab to some degree, but also imbued with a keen awareness of status distinctions between different lineages and clans among the Sunni Arabs which he, along with the greater part of the officer corps, saw as distinct from and superior to the Shi'i Arabs and Kurds of Iraq.

Assisted by his kinsman Saddam Husain, Hasan al-Bakr also

A history of Iraq



14 Mustafa Barzani (leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party until his death in 1979), c. 1973

Talabani faction with aspects of Ba'thism, Barzani represented the real power in the Kurdish region. The secret talks, conducted principally by Saddam Husain, led to the manifesto of March 1970 in which the government seemed to commit itself to a recognition of Kurdish rights that far exceeded anything that had been conceded before: the distinct national identity of the Kurds was recognised, as was their language, and they were promised participation in government and predominance in the local administration. A special, unified administrative region would be created in which distinctive measures would apply and it would incorporate all those areas in which a Kurdish majority lived, according to a census yet to be carried out. A joint committee of government and Kurdish representatives was set up to discuss the detailed application of the manifesto's principles, working towards a 1974 deadline.

Barzani, for his part, broke his links with Iran, implemented a cease-fire and began to co-operate with the newly established committee. He did not, however, trust the government, keeping the *peshmerga* intact and

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