	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1		Summary for Policy Makers	
2			
3 ⊿	Drafting Authorse		
4	Drafting Authors:		
5	-	oninck (The Netherlands), Opha Pauline I	
6	Ferrat (UK/France), Ove Hoegh-	Guldberg (Australia), Daniela Jacob (Ger	many), Kejun Jiang (China),
7	Valérie Masson-Delmotte (Franc	e), Wilfran Moufouma-Okia (France/Con	go), Rosalind Pidcock
8	(UK), Anna Pirani (Italy), Elvira	Poloczanska (Germany), Hans-Otto Pörtr	ner (Germany), Aromar
9	Revi (India), Debra C. Roberts (S	South Africa), Joeri Rogelj (Austria/Belgi	um), Joyashree Roy (India),
10		mes Skea (UK), Raphael Slade (UK), Dre	
11	2	Jamaica), Petra Tschakert (Australia), He	
12	Panmao Zhai (China)		
13			
14	Date of Draft: 08 January 2018		
15	5		

16 Notes: First Order Draft of SR1.5 SPM for Expert and Government review.

First Order Draft

SPM

SPM 1 Introduction

SPM 1.1 Context

4 5 This summary presents key findings from the Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 6 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context 7 of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and 8 efforts to eradicate poverty. The narrative of the summary is supported with a series of highlighted 9 headline statements.

10

1

2 3

The certainty in key assessment findings¹ in this Special Report is communicated as in the IPCC AR5² 11 12 Working Group Reports and Special Reports. The constraints on the timeline and literature available 13 for the preparation of this report means that many policy-relevant statements are presented with a 14 confidence qualifier, not a likelihood and this does not detract from their importance. {1.6}

15

16 The Special Report is prepared in the context of unequivocal and sustained global warming and sea 17 level rise, and continued emissions of greenhouse gases. The Special Report assesses knowledge on 18 global climate change, regional climate changes, vulnerabilities, impacts and risks at 1.5°C global

19 warming above pre-industrial levels for natural and human systems, taking into account adaptive

20 capacities and their limits. It provides new insights on impacts that may be avoided with 1.5°C global 21 warming compared to 2°C. It explores global greenhouse gas emission pathways consistent with

22 limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, including those which temporarily 23 exceed 1.5°C global warming before returning to 1.5°C by the end of this century. The Special Report 24 assesses the pace and scale of transformations consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C 25 compared to 2°C global warming, in the context of sustainable development, poverty eradication and 26 equity, considering adaptation and mitigation options.

27 28 This report includes information relevant to the Paris Agreement including: Article 2 on strengthening 29 the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and

30 efforts to eradicate poverty; Article 4 on achieving a balance between anthropogenic emissions by 31 sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of 32 equity; Article 7 on enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability

33 to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development; Article 8 on averting, 34 minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

35 Article 9 on providing financial resources to assist developing country Parties; Article 10 on sharing a

36 long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer; Article 11

37 on enhancing the capacity and ability of developing country Parties, in particular countries with the

38 least capacity; Article 12 on enhancing climate change education, training, public awareness, public

39 participation and public access to information; and Article 14 on the Global Stocktake.

40

² AR5: Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC.

¹ Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence. The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33-66%, unlikely 0-33%, very unlikely 0-10%, exceptionally unlikely 0-1%. Additional terms (extremely likely 95-100%, more likely than not >50-100%, more unlikely than likely 0-<50%, extremely unlikely 0-5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely. See for more details: Mastrandrea, M.D., C.B. Field, T.F. Stocker, O. Edenhofer, K.L. Ebi, D.J. Frame, H. Held, E. Kriegler, K.J. Mach, P.R. Matschoss, G.-K. Plattner, G.W. Yohe and F.W. Zwiers, 2010: Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Geneva, Switzerland, 4 pp

First Order Draft

SPM

Box SPM 1: Definition of global mean surface temperature change and 1.5°C global warming

This report adopts a working definition of global mean surface temperature change at any given time relative to the climatology of pre-industrial levels as combined land surface air temperature and sea surface temperature, averaged for a 30-year period centred on that time. The climatology of pre-industrial global mean is based on the 51-year period 1850-1900. (Figure SPM1) {1.2, Figure 1.2}

In this report, '1.5°C global mean temperature' or '1.5°C warmer world' refers to a 1.5°C humaninduced globally-averaged surface temperature change above the pre-industrial climatology.


13 SPM 1.2 High level statements from this report14

- There is very high risk that under current emission trajectories and current national pledges global warming will exceed 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require a rapid phase out of net global carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions and deep reductions in non-CO₂ drivers of climate change such as methane, with more pronounced and rapid reductions required than for limiting global warming to 2°C.
- Even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C above pre-industrial temperatures, climatic trends and changing extreme events in oceans and over land imply risks for ecosystems and human societies larger than today, especially where vulnerabilities are highest. Projected impacts are larger at 2°C, with the potential to affect more strongly economic development, increase costs of adaptation, damage, and loss, and cause increasing risks by exceeding the adaptive capacity of vulnerable systems. Sea level rise will continue for centuries at both 1.5°C and 2°C global warming.
- In a 1.5°C warmer world, climate change and climate change responses will affect people in countries at all levels of development, but those most at risk will be individuals and communities experiencing multidimensional poverty, persistent vulnerabilities, and various forms of deprivation and disadvantage. This is unless adaptation and mitigation actions are guided by concerns for equity and fairness and enhanced support for eradicating poverty and reducing inequalities.
- Holding global warming to below 1.5°C implies transformational adaptation and mitigation, behaviour change, supportive institutional arrangements and multi-level governance.
- Emissions reductions in all sectors would be needed in order to meet the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. All available 1.5°C pathways include three broad approaches, to varying extent. The first is lowering energy demand in buildings, industry and transport, and demand for agricultural products. The second is lowering emissions from energy supply, land use and agriculture through, for example, the deployment of low carbon energy technologies. The third is through removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
- Different portfolios of emission reduction measures have different implications for sustainable development, including regional climate change, food security, biodiversity, the provision of ecosystem services, and the vulnerability of the poor. While demand side measures have many synergies with sustainable development, portfolios that mainly consider supply side measures and affect patterns of land use carry a greater risk of trade-offs.

	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5		
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Delayed action or weak near-term increase the risks associated with a 'overshoot') or of warming remain or weak near-term policies increase Modelling suggests that having a the 21st century without overshoot SPM 1.3 Background 	exceeding 1.5°C global warming above 1.5°C by the end of se the severity of projected im 66% likelihood of holding wa	ing temporarily (referred to as f the century. Delayed action pacts and adaptation needs.		
12	1.1 Greenhouse gas emissions from h				
13 14	warming, which has been occurring since 1950. The global mean tempera				
15	relative to pre-industrial levels. At cu		Ŭ		
16	would reach 1.5°C by the 2040s. {1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3}				
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	 The global mean temperature reac 2017/2018³. Over one quarter of the greater warming than the global are at least one season. Such regions a <i>(high confidence)</i>. (Figure SPM1) At the present rate of greenhouse greater decade, as assessed in the AR5, gl <i>(high confidence)</i>. (Figure SPM1) 	he global population lives in r verage, with annual mean tem are found particularly in north {1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, Figure 1.3} gas emissions and global warr lobal mean temperatures woul	egions that already experience peratures exceeding 1.5° C in ern mid- and high-latitudes ning of 0.17° C (±0.07°C) per		
27 28	1.2 Future global warming will depe	nd primarily on future cu	mulative CO ₂ emissions.		
29	As cumulative CO ₂ emissions are reduced under ambitious mitigation scenarios, the				
30 31	mitigation of emissions of other clim important. {1.2.6, 2.2, 2.3}	ate warming agents becon	nes progressively more		
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44	 Avoiding substantial global mea experienced is geophysically pos- climate forcers. There would be such that some regions would w <i>confidence</i>). (Figure SPM1) {1.2.4 Limiting global mean warming to greenhouse gas emissions, even w warming. The Nationally Determin Agreement will result, in aggregat higher than those in scenarios com {1.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.2.5, 4.3.8; Com 	ssible, but depends on rates a regional adjustment follow varm even if the global mean 6, 2.2, 2.3} 1.5°C would require rapid and rith a temporary overshoot and ned Contributions (NDCs) sul te, in global greenhouse gas er apatible with limiting global w	of reductions in emissions of ving a cessation of emissions, temperature does not <i>(high</i> d deep reductions in l later return to 1.5°C bmitted under the Paris nissions in 2030 that are		

 $^{^3}$ This is using the definition of SPM Box 1 and includes an extrapolation or near term predictions of future warming so that the level of anthropogenic warming is reported for a 30 year period centered on today.

	First Or	rder Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1				
2	1.3 At	1.5°C global warming, the risks to	natural, managed and human syste	ems depend
3		· · · · ·	erability, on the choices of adaptatio	
4	mitiga	ation options, on the occurrence of	overshoot above 1.5°C, and their dif	ferent
5	implic	cations at regional scales. Adaptation	on and mitigation measures also hav	e
6	consec	quences for sustainable developme	nt. {1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 3.2, 5.6}	
$\begin{array}{c} 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\end{array}$	•	 is 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. {1 Many impacts are different in a world world in which global mean temperatu irreversible, such as mortality of species have long-lasting impacts on natural sy temperature is high (<i>high confidence</i>). Impacts will depend on the level of vult to adapt to changing conditions, and th (Figure SPM3) {5.6} Climate-resilient development pathway development, including poverty eradication equity and fairness with respect to the equity and fairness with res	where global warming is limited to 1.5°C re temporarily overshoots 1.5°C. As some es and ecosystems, even brief periods of o ystems, especially if the peak in global me	compared to a e impacts are vershoot can an their capacity nt trajectories. sustainable bhasising hit global



 $\begin{array}{r}
 1 \\
 2 \\
 3 \\
 4 \\
 5 \\
 6 \\
 7 \\
 8 \\
 9 \\
 10 \\
 11 \\
 12 \\
 13 \\
 14 \\
 15 \\
 \end{array}$

16

17

Figure SPM 1: Observed global warming, and estimation of human-induced temperature change for a range of possible climate response magnitudes. Illustration of future warming response to two stylized scenarios of reductions in CO2 emissions, with different hypothetical non-CO2 forcing stabilization.

Change in global mean temperature using updated AR5 observational datasets (grey shaded band) updated until end of 2016, relative to the reference period 1850-1900. The average warming levels corresponding to the SR1.5 near-term reference period (2006-2015) is shown with uncertainties (vertical green bar). One estimate of historical human-induced temperature change is shown {Figure 1.1}, with the yellow vertical bar indicating the estimated uncertainties in the human-induced warming for the final data point (2016) calculated using the relative uncertainty in near-term warming trend from AR5. The AR5 assessment of near-term projections are marked with a black bar. Possible global temperature responses to a stylized linear decline of CO₂ emissions from 2020 to net zero in 2060 (E_{2060} , middle panel) is shown (upper panel, green shading) for a set of possible climate system properties taken from across the AR5 assessed ranges, and assuming a

	First Order Draft		SPM	IPCC SR1.5		
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	SDM 2 Jmpoor	Bars to the right of the stabilised levels of futu (blue and brown bars), net-zero in 2040 (E_{2045} , described in {Chapter 2	ve forcing that stabilises at present-da upper panel illustrate the possible per ire non-CO ₂ radiative forcing levels a and under a more rapid stylized decli , right-most bar). The 17-83 percentil 2} are shown in the bottom two panel	ak warming under different bove or below current levels ne in CO_2 emissions to reach es of the scenarios ensemble		
9 10 11	-	e	arming and associated risks mplemented after revision of Cha	pter 3 Executive Summary]		
12 13 14 15 16 17	2.1 Every increase of 0.5°C of global mean surface temperature increases the risks of climate change impacts. The increase in global land surface temperatures is larger that the global average. Risks associated with changes in precipitation patterns and some extreme events, storms, and sea level rise increase (<i>high confidence</i>). The rise in extreme temperatures in some regions can be more than three times larger than the change in global mean surface temperature. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.7, Cross-Chapter Box 3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4.3}					
18	giobai mean su		(3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.7, Cross-Chapter Dox .	.2, Closs-Chapter Dox 4.3;		
$ \begin{array}{r} 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\\ 26\\ 27\\ 28\\ 29\\ 30\\ 31\\ 32\\ 33\\ 34\\ 35\\ 36\\ 37\\ 38\\ 39\\ 40\\ \end{array} $	 Changes in temperature and precipitation extreme indices are detectable in observations for 1991-2010 period compared with 1960-1979, during which time an approximate 0.5°C gl warming occurred. {3.3.1} In some regions, the rise in extreme temperatures is projected to be more than three times larger than the change in global mean surface temperature. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter B 3.2} The risks from land-based heatwaves and temperature extremes increase with global mean temperature rise. There is a faster rate of increase of temperature extremes in most land regions at 2°C compared to 1.5°C, in particular in Central and Eastern North America, Ce and Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, Western and Central Asia, and Southern Africa. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 3.2} An increased risk from hot days (10% of warmest days) occurs with the additional 0.5°C 1.5°C to 2°C global warming. The increase in risk is most pronounced in the tropics. (Fig SPM3) {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 3.2} Projected risks from water scarcity, flood and drought are greater at 2°C global warming compared to 1.5°C. The largest increase of risks associated with floods at 2°C, compared 1.5°C, are projected in Asia, North America and Europe. The greatest increase in water st is projected for the Mediterranean region. (Figure SPM3) {Cross-Chapter Box 4.3} 					
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48	• There is greater risk from the most intense tropical cyclones with 2°C of global warming compared to 1.5°C. The most intense (category 4 and 5) tropical cyclones are projected to occur more frequently, with higher peak wind speeds and lower central pressures at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming. {3.3.7}			yclones are projected to		
	Do Not Cite, Quot	e or Distribute	SPM-7	Total pages: 31		

	First Order Draft SPM		IPCC SR1.5		
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	2.2 Climate change impacts all ecosystems and their services on all continents a oceans, including terrestrial, wetland and freshwater, marine and coastal ecosy Risks increase between today and global warming of 1.5°C, as well as between 2°C global warming. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., 3.3.4, 3.4.9, 3.5.6, Box 3.5}				
	 past impacts. {3.3.1 There is greater risk for ecosystems, per than the global aver 	in the Arctic region with increasing level of glob nafrost and human systems. Such regions experi- age (high confidence). (Figure SPM2) {3.3.3., 3.	bal warming, for example, ence warming rates faster 3.4, 3.4.9, 3.5.6, Box 3.5}		
	risk to ecosystems and b sub-tropical and tropica	v levels of temperature, acidification and h iodiversity. The loss of Arctic sea ice and t l coral reefs are significantly larger at 2°C 4.2, 3.4.4.2.1, 3.4.6.4, 3.5.2.4, Box 3.6, 3.7}	the degradation of		
$17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \\ 24 \\ 25 \\ 26 \\ 27 \\ 28 \\ 29 \\ 30 \\ 31 \\ 32 \\ 33 \\ 34 \\ 35 \\ 36 \\ 37 \\ 38 \\ 39 \\ 40 \\ 41 \\ 42 \\ 43 \\ 44 \\ 45 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 1$	 with it being possib Global warming of take many millennia large-scale changes Oceans are experier global warming of 1 ecosystems to appea experience high rate Observed shifts in costructure and servic rates in tropical regis SPM2) {3.4} Warm water coral retat at 1.5°C and at {3.4.4.2.1} Marine ecosystem s warming and acidified to the service of the	increases the risk of the Arctic Ocean being near le at 1.5°C global warming. {3.4.4.1.6} 1.5°C leads to fundamental changes in ocean che a to recover. At global warming of 1.5°C, ocean a and amplifying the risks of temperature rise for of acting unprecedented changes with critical thresho .5°C and above, for example driving some speci ar. Ecosystems that are relatively less able to move as of mortality and loss. {3.4.4.1.4, 3.4.4.1.5} cean biodiversity have major implications for for es, fisheries, and human livelihoods. The risk of of ons is higher with 2°C of global warming compa- cef ecosystems are losing live coral cover at prese 2°C they will no longer be dominated by corals. ervices, fisheries and aquaculture are already at r faction, and these impacts are projected to get pro 5°C, 2°C and higher. (Figure SPM2) {3.4.4.2, 3	mistry from which it may acidification is driving becan biological systems. olds being reached at es to relocate and novel we are projected to od webs, ecosystem elevated local extinction ured to 1.5°C. (Figure ent. They are at high risk (Figure SPM2)		

	First Ord	er Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2		land, risks of local and region rsity distribution are lower at	· · · ·	
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		Risks for natural and managed eco lands. {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.5.5.10}	systems are amplified on dryla	inds compared to humid
		Shifts in elevation and latitude of b occurred with 1°C of warming (<i>hig</i> change. Approximately 25% more Himalayas, South Africa and Austr SPM3) {3.4.3.1}	<i>h confidence</i>) and are attributation biome shifts are projected to c	ble to anthropogenic climate occur in the Arctic, Tibet,
	;	Local species extinction (extirpation (extirpation 1.5°C. Climate-induced range lossed approximately 50% with 2°C globar (Figure SPM2) {3.5.2.4.2}	es in plants, vertebrates and ins	sects increase by
18 19 20 21 22	global v infrasti expecte	level will continue to rise for warming compared to 1.5°C, i cucture, and freshwater suppl d to be reached earlier at 2°C (4, 3.4.4.2.3)	ncreasing risks to coastal (ies. High risk levels and ad	ecosystems, laptation limits are
$\begin{array}{c} 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\\ 26\\ 27\\ 28\\ 29\\ 30\\ 31\\ 32\\ 33\\ 34\\ 35\\ 36\\ 37\\ 38\\ 39\\ 40\\ 41\\ 42\\ 43\\ 44\\ 45\\ 46\end{array}$	•	Past emissions do not commit to susea level rise. It is <i>virtually certain</i> worlds well beyond the end of the Available studies suggest that glob 2°C world compared to 1.5°C. Three Greenland and West Antarctic ice projected risk associated with long greater for a 2°C warmer world control for the risks for hundreds of millions loss of cultural identity, ill health, a global warming of 1.5°C compared Impacts associated with sea level r critically important in sensitive environatural coastal ecosystems can be a rising sea levels and intensifying states and coastal hardening. {3	that sea level will continue to current century. {1.2.6, 3.3.12 al mean sea level rise by 2100 esholds for irreversible, multi- sheets may occur at 1.5°C or 2 -term commitment to multi- mpared to 1.5°C. {3.3.12.3} of people in coastal communit and reduced coastal/mangrove d to 2°C. (Figure SPM2) {3.4} ise and salinity changes to gro vironments such as small island a more cost-effective protectio torms compared to artificial in	rise in both 1.5°C and 2°C will be ~0.1m greater in a millennial loss of the °C global warming. The etre-scale sea level rise is ies from eroding livelihoods, protection are lower with undwater or estuaries are ds. Preserving or restoring n of coastal regions from
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45	•	global warming of 1.5°C compared Impacts associated with sea level r critically important in sensitive en- natural coastal ecosystems can be a rising sea levels and intensifying se	to 2°C. (Figure SPM2) {3.4} ise and salinity changes to grovironments such as small islam a more cost-effective protectio torms compared to artificial in	undwater or estuaries are ds. Preserving or restoring n of coastal regions from

	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	security, human security, compared to today, and l risks are greatest for peo marginalisation; people i poor urban residents; an	ocieties through impacts on health, liveliho , and infrastructure are higher with 1.5°C higher still with 2°C global warming comp ple facing multiple forms of poverty, ineq n coastal communities and those dependen d communities displaced from their home 0.1, 3.4.10.2, 3.5.5.4, 3.5.5.5, Box 3.2, Box 3.3, Box 3.7, 5.	global warming pared to 1.5°C. These uality, and nt on agriculture; s. {3.4.6.2, 3.4.6.5, 3.4.7.2,
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 vulnerable populatio and coastal-depender are expected where g Limits to adaptation <i>confidence)</i>, with pla States (Figure SPM3 Globally, the poorest predominantly through 	bal warming will disproportionately affect alread ns, particularly indigenous people and systems in nt livelihoods, and small-island developing states global temperature exceeds 1.5°C (<i>medium evide</i> and associated losses exist at every level of temp ice-specific implications, for example for Pacific) {5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3} t people are projected to experience the impacts of gh increased food prices, food insecurity and hur	h the Arctic, agriculture- s. More severe impacts <i>nce, high agreement</i>). berature increase <i>(medium</i> c Small Island Developing of 1.5°C global warming nger, income losses, lost
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39	livelihood opportunit can occur, for instand flooding, with over 1 agriculture and food	ties, adverse health impacts and population displ ce, from increased heat stress and other extreme .00 million people projected to go into poverty th prices (<i>limited evidence, medium agreement</i>) {3	acements. Such impacts events, such as coastal rrough impacts on .4.10.1, 5.2.2}
	complex regional pat transmission of infec disease (e.g., malaria temperature change,	es greater risks to human health than warming of tterns, with a few exceptions. Warmer temperatu tious diseases with increases and decreases proje a, dengue, West Nile virus, and Lyme disease), re and also <i>very likely</i> depending on the extent and and vulnerability reduction. (Figure SPM2, SPM	res are <i>likely</i> to affect the ected depending on the egion, degree of effectiveness of
	resources by an estin	warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C reduces stress nated 50% (relative to 1980-2009), with reduced n {3.4.10.2, 3.5.5.5, Box 3.2}.	•
	and South America, risk for food product	ion in the Middle-East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Sou is reduced when global warming is limited to 1.5 ion and extreme poverty is significant in these re .5.5.4, 3.4.6.5, 3.4.7.3}	^{5°} C compared to 2°C. The
40 41 42		rres will directly impact climate dependent touris sports tourism (<i>high confidence</i>). {Box 3.3, Box	
43	2.7 Global warming of 1.	5°C implies higher risks than today for th	e displacement of
44		assing limits to adaptation, though the lev	
45	than at 2°C global warm	ing. {3.4.6.2, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.10, 3.4.10.1, 3.4.10.2, 5.2, 5.2.1,	, 5.2.2}
46			

First Order Draft

 SPM

- Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C or higher levels of warming will lower the risk of extreme events and threats to food and water security and hence lessen the potential for political struggles over scarce resources, which contributes to lessening human conflict. {3.4.10}
 - Global warming above 1.5°C will worsen existing inequalities and increase poverty through ill health, increased food prices and hunger, mal- and under-nutrition, the erosion of livelihoods, displacement, and potential loss of what is meaningful for people's dignity and lives. {3.4.6.2, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.10.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.2}
 - Disaster-related displacement is projected to increase over the 21st century with over 90% of disaster-related displacement between 2001 to 2015 related to climate and weather events *(medium confidence)*. {3.4.10.2}
 - [Place holder: adaptation and limits to adaptation, and residual risks. {CH3, CH4, 5.2}]




Figure SPM 2:

: [Placeholder] Levels of risk associated with 5 different reasons for concern are illustrated for increasing levels of global mean temperature and are the same as those presented in the IPCC AR5 Working Group II report. Icons indicate selected risks that played an important role in locating transitions between levels of risks. Coloured dots indicate overarching key risk

Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute

Total pages: 31

First Order Draft

SPM

IPCC SR1.5


1categories that were considered in the assessment for each reason for concern (RFC)⁴.2Confidence in the judgments of risk transitions is indicated as medium (M) or high (H) and3the range over which transitions take place is indicated with brackets. For example, for RFC14there is high confidence in the location of the transition from Undetectable to Moderate risk,5which is informed by impacts to coral reef, Arctic and mountain systems; and there is high6confidence in the location of the transition from High to Very High risk, which is informed7by impacts to coral reef and Arctic systems as well as to species associated with unique and8threatened systems. This assessment takes autonomous adaptation into account, as well as9limits to adaptation (RFC 1, 3, 5) independently of development pathway. [To be updated10and developed to highlight more clearly the recent literature on the differences between risks11for 1.5°C/2°C warming].

⁴ Key risk categories (O'Neill et al., 2017): (i) Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal zones and small island developing states and other small islands due to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea-level rise. (ii) Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations due to inland flooding in some regions. (iii) Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services such as electricity, water supply, and health and emergency services. (iv) Risk of mortality and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors in urban or rural areas. (v) Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for poorer populations in urban and rural settings. (vi) Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to drinking and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity, particularly for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid regions. (vii) Risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and the Arctic. (viii) Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for livelihoods.

First Order Draft

```
SPM
```

IPCC SR1.5



 $\begin{array}{c}
 1 \\
 2 \\
 3 \\
 4 \\
 5 \\
 6 \\
 7 \\
 8 \\
 9 \\
 10 \\
 11 \\
 12 \\
 \end{array}$

Figure SPM 3:

[Place holder – AR5 SYR Figure SPM.8 and caption] Representative key risks for each region, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Each key risk is assessed as very low, low, medium, high or very high. Risk levels are presented for three time frames: present, near term (here, for 2030–2040) and long term (here, for 2080–2100). In the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels are presented for 2°C global temperature increase above pre-industrial levels. For each timeframe, risk levels are indicated for a continuation of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. Identification of key risks was based on expert

Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute

Total pages: 31

First Order Draft SPM IPCC SR1.5 1 2 3 4 5 judgment using the following specific criteria: large magnitude, high probability or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation. [To be adapted according to Chapter 3 outcomes. Risk assessment for +4°C to be dropped.] 6 7 SPM 3 Emission pathways and policy responses compatible with 1.5°C global warming 8 9 3.1 The assessed literature identifies potential emission pathways consistent with 10 limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Some pathways hold warming below 1.5°C throughout the 21st century while in others global warming overshoots 1.5°C before 11 returning to 1.5°C by 2100. {1.2.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.2, 2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.2.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.6.2, 4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 12 13 4.1} 14 15 Limiting global mean warming to 1.5°C would require rapid and deep reductions in • 16 greenhouse gas emissions, even with a temporary overshoot and later return to 1.5°C. The 17 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement will 18 result, in aggregate, in global greenhouse emissions in 2030 which are higher than those in 19 scenarios compatible with global warming of 1.5°C by 2100 (high confidence). 20 21 • Because of the cumulative impact of CO_2 emissions, any delay in emission reductions 22 (including the delay implied by the post-2020 start date of the NDCs) significantly increases 23 the risk associated with a temperature overshoot and would require faster subsequent 24 emissions reductions and/or more CO₂ removal. CO₂ removal can accelerate the decline of 25 CO₂ emissions to help avoid a temperature overshoot, and in scenarios where a temperature 26 overshoot occurs, active net CO₂ removal is required to achieve a global mean temperature of 27 1.5°C by the end of the 21st century (high confidence). {1.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.2.5, 4.3.8, Cross-28 Chapter Box 4.1} 29 30 Based on integrated assessment models, historical emissions, current policies and patterns of • 31 investment have already placed scenarios limiting warming below 1.5°C without overshoot 32 with at least 66% likelihood out of reach. (medium confidence). {2.1.3, 2.3.2, 2.5.1, 2.5.2} 33 34 Uncertainties remain in radiative forcings and Earth system feedbacks. For a given emission • 35 scenario, these uncertainties increase the risk of global warming exceeding 1.5°C (medium 36 confidence). {2.2.2, 2.6.2} 37 38 **3.2** Cumulative future CO₂ emissions compatible with avoiding a given level of global 39 warming are often referred to as carbon budgets. Carbon budgets depend on the 40 likelihood of avoiding a given level of global warming. They also account for changes in non-CO₂ climate forcers, such as methane and aerosols. Carbon budgets may refer to 41 42 cumulative emissions from 2016 until peak warming or until warming returns to 1.5°C 43 after a temporary overshoot. {2.1.3, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.1, 2.6.1, 2.6.2} 44 45 Two types of carbon budgets are used in this assessment. The threshold peak budget is defined 46 as the cumulative CO_2 emissions from 1 January 2016 until the time that the global mean 47 temperature peaks at (or below) 1.5°C or 2°C. The threshold return budget is defined as the

Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute

Total pages: 31

	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2 3 4	returns to 1.5°C	$_2$ emissions from 1 January 2016 until the time that C or 2°C after a temperature overshoot. Both types of te drivers (Table SPM1, Figure SPM4). {2.1.3, 2.2.	of carbon budget account for
5 6 7 8 9	without oversh be exhausted ir	beak budget compatible with a 50% likelihood of lin oot is estimated to be 580 (490-640) GtCO ₂ (Table a 12-16 years if emissions were to continue at 2015 hat point, to limit global warming to 1.5° C without	SPM1). This budget would levels, and thus it would be
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	pathway. In the CO2 drivers, th and a 25% chan the threshold re ambitious mitig	hagnitude of future warming from non-CO ₂ drivers e 5% of emission pathways that experience the great here is a 3% chance that the 1.5°C threshold peak bu- nce that the threshold return budget is already exhau- ter budget is exhausted is reduced to less than 1% gation pathways for non-CO ₂ warming agents (media $\{2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.1\}$	test warming due to non- udget is already exhausted usted. The likelihood that o in scenarios with the most
18 19 20 21	66% likelihood	non-CO ₂ climate drivers are not significantly reduct that global temperature will exceed 1.5° C, even wisidered in 1.5° C scenarios (medium confidence). {2.	ith the most stringent CO ₂

	Likelihood of limiting warming	Threshold Return Budgets GtCO ₂	Threshold Peak Budgets GtCO ₂
Limiting warming to	50% likelihood	590 (420-880)	580 (490–640)
1.5°C	66% likelihood	390 (200–730)	Not Available
Limiting warming to	50% likelihood	960 (570–1460)	1450 (1330–1550)
2°C	66% likelihood	910 (570–1210)	1180 (1050–1380)

Table SPM 1: Two types of remaining carbon budgets based on available scenarios and compatible with different likelihoods of limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Median and likely range due to geophysical uncertainty (around median non-CO2 contribution) of Threshold Peak Budget (medium confidence) and Threshold Return Budget (medium confidence) in GtCO2 compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C for the 1st January 2016 onwards⁵. {Table 2.4}.

 $^{^5}$ Budgets are computed assuming that warming is limited to 1.5 °C with either 50% likelihood or 66% likelihood and accounting for non- CO_2 drivers. Budget ranges are based on available scenarios and span physical uncertainty arund the median achievement of non-CO₂ emission reductions.




Figure SPM 4:

1234567

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

Summary of the various uncertainties affecting carbon budget size for holding warming below 1.5°C relative to preindustrial levels from the 1st January 2016 onwards. For threshold peak budget best estimate of 580 GtCO₂ as given in Table SPM 1, the climate response uncertainties associated to this budget are represented by the 5%-95% confidence interval inferred from outcomes due to variation of geophysical parameters in the simple climate model setup used for this assessment. Uncertainties in climate response include those associated to radiative forcing, climate sensitivity, and carbon-cycle feedbacks. Societal choices influencing the carbon budget size are related to societal variations for non-CO₂ forcing which are illustrated by the full range of forcing futures found in the integrated pathways available in the SR1.5 scenarios database. A "large non-CO2 warming contribution" represents 0.85 W m⁻² of non-CO₂ radiative forcing at the time of deriving the carbon budget, a "small non- CO2 cooling contribution" represents -0.02 W m⁻² of non-CO₂ radiative forcing. The median non- CO₂ radiative forcing estimate across all available pathways is 0.45 W m⁻² of non-CO₂ radiative forcing. The total carbon budget range provides an overview of the combined uncertainties in threshold peak budget due to the aforementioned factors. Median threshold peak budgets and threshold return budgets as given in Table SPM 1 are indicated by the vertical bold white line in the bottom panel.

19 20 21

	First Orde	er Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
$\begin{array}{c}1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\3\\24\\25\\26\\27\\28\\29\\30\\31\\32\\33\\34\\5\\36\\37\\38\\940\\41\\42\\43\\44\\5\end{array}$	warmin zero arc stringer	emission pathways compatible with a ng to 1.5°C by 2100 imply rapid reduc ound or shortly after the middle of th nt reductions in non-CO ₂ climate for uorocarbons. {1.3, 1.2, 2.2.2, 2.4.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.	ctions in global CO ₂ emissions, r ne 21st century. Such pathways a cers, primarily methane, black c	eaching net llso imply
	 (•] 1	1.5°C scenarios involve deep reductions in before global warming reaches 1.5°C. They (high confidence). {1.3, 1.2, 2.2.2, Table 2. Because of the cumulative impact of global reductions requires faster subsequent reduc subsequent active net CO_2 removal to reduc {1.2}	 also involve deep reductions in non- 7, 2.4.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.4. 2.5.3} CO₂ emissions, any initial delay in entities to meet the same temperature and the s	CO2 drivers. emission mbition, or
	systems in these	1.5°C emission pathways involve rapids, urban systems, and patterns of lander systems would lower the requirementury. {2.1.3, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3	d use. More extensive and rapid to the second of the secon	transitions
] 6 2 1 1 8	Modelled pathways for remaining below 1. Historically, rapid rates of change have bee example, electricity supply. There is, howe and economic scale of the energy, land, urb consistent with a 1.5°C warmer world has r require more planning, coordination and dis governance than the spontaneous or coincic agreement, medium evidence). {4.2, 4.2.2,	en observed temporarily and in some s ver, no documented precedent for the ban and industrial transitions implicit no documented historic precedents. Su sruptive innovation across actors and dental changes observed in the past (<i>n</i>	sectors, for geographical in pathways uch transitions scales of
	1	In 1.5°C scenarios, mitigation options are d more complete portfolio of possible mitigat 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}		
	t	Delayed action or weak near-term policies target and the amount of stranded investme term mitigation challenges <i>(high confidence)</i>	ent in fossil-based capacity, leading to	
	s t	In 1.5°C pathways rapid and extensive mitis simultaneously. Such pathways generally ra- than they do CO ₂ removal. Compared to 2°c account for around two thirds of the ~600 C and CO ₂ removal for the remaining third (~	ely more heavily on additional mitiga C pathways, additional mitigation me $GtCO_2$ of CO_2 reductions by the end of	easures of the century,

	First Or	rder Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	involv global CO ₂ r chanc the re	l mitigation pathways compatible wi re removal of CO ₂ from the atmosph l warming may reach up to 1.9°C be removal than scenarios that keep ove e that the levels of CO ₂ removal imp quired scale and speed of deploymer opment objectives. {2.2.2, 2.4.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.3	ere. Scenarios with high overshoot fore returning to 1.5°C by 2100, in rshoot as low as possible. There is lied in the scenarios might not be f nt required and trade-offs with sus	s, where volve more a high feasible due
8 9 10 11	•	All the 1.5°C pathways analysed use CO from sectors for which no mitigation me 2.3.1, 2.3.4. 2.5.3}		
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	•	The total amount of CO_2 removal project of 380-1130 GtCO ₂ over the 21st century for emissions for which no mitigation me used after carbon neutrality has been ach prior to that point <i>(medium confidence)</i> .	y. 25-85% of this O_2 removal is used to easures have been identified, while the r ieved to compensate for exceeding the	o compensate remainder is
19 20 21	•	The required scale of CO ₂ removal deper and the degree by which they exceed the		ng decades
22 23 24	•	Biomass demand is substantial in all 1.5 ⁶ removal potential. The future availability use transitions and transitions in other se	y of, and demand for, biomass is closely	
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40	•	All 1.5°C pathways include the option of biomass energy with carbon capture and capture and storage, are in early stages of effective mitigation options and are not to deployed as early as 2020 in some scena and afforestation have implications for h growth of trees and energy crops or to st {2.3.3, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 4.3.8}	storage (BECCS). Other options, such a f development or need significant upgra ypically included in current scenarios. H rios but is not deployed at all in others. ow land is used to produce biomass thro	as direct air ding to be BECCS is Both BECCS ough the
	•	Measures that lead to a net removal of C feasibility constraints. For example, incr increase pressure on land and water reso quality. Therefore, the scale and speed o may be challenging (<i>high agreement</i>). {2	eased biomass production and use has the urces, food production, biodiversity, and f implementation assumed in some 1.5°	ne potential to 1 to affect air-
41	3.6 So	me patterns of development, for exa	mple those that involve high popu	lation
42	Ŭ	h, slow economic development, and	- ·	
43		ind use systems, increase the chance		•
44 45	· ·	ond reach, causing associated risks. ' s are related to the underlying pace a		U
43 46		iour and lifestyle. {2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2,	÷ 1 ÷	

	First Or	der Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	•	The transformations necessary to limit warr a 2°C limit, but more pronounced and rapid global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C in measures, faster socio-technical transitions, short term that target both supply and dema would involve rapid and large scale behavid {2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.3.5, 2.5, Sustainable development, the Sustainable In difficult to achieve without sufficient considered to the social	l over the next decades (high confidence nplies a more complete portfolio of miti , and more ambitious international polic and (very high confidence). Such transfe our and lifestyle change (very high conf 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.4.3, 4.4.5} Development Goals and well-being for a deration of the equity and ethics of such	e). Limiting gation cies in the prmations <i>fidence</i>).
13	3.7 Iss	ues related to governance and ethics, j	public acceptability and impacts o	n
14	sustai	nable development could render solar	radiation management economica	lly,
15	sociall	y and institutionally infeasible. {4.3.9, 4	.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 4.2}	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	• •	While none of the pathways assessed in the management, solar radiation management h temperature-related impacts of global warn ocean acidification, would largely remain us the adverse side effects of solar radiation m governance issues, ethical implications, pull development could render solar radiation m institutionally infeasible. {4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4. Uncertainties related to solar radiation man understanding, efficiency to limit global wa legitimise their potential implementation. (a Chapter Box 4.2)	has been considered in the context of rec ning, while other impacts, such as those unaffected. Even in the uncertain case the hanagement could be avoided, multi-level blic resistance and impacts on sustainab hanagement economically, socially and 5} hagement include technological maturity arming, and the ability to scale, govern a low agreement, medium evidence). {4.3	related to nat some of el ile y, physical and .9, Cross-
32 33	SPM 4	4 Strengthening the global response in efforts to eradicate poverty	the context of sustainable develo	pment and
34 35	4.1 Th	ere is very high likelihood that under	current emission trajectories and	current
36		al pledges the Earth will warm global	v	
37		causing associated risks. The national	· -	
38	under	the Paris Agreement will result, in ag	gregate, in global greenhouse emis	sions in
39		which are higher than those in scenario		0
40		PC by 2100. More ambitious pledges we		
41		term, albeit offset by a variety of co-be		
42 43		ation costs in the long-term. {2.3.1, 2.3.1.1	, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.1, 4.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.6	, Cross-
43 44	Cnapter	• Box 4.1, 5.4.2}		
45 46	•	Following current nationally determined co that allows for the interactions between the		

	First O	rder Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5				
$1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\3\\24\\25$		would be required to limit global warming to below 1.5°C. {2.3.1.1, 2.3.5, Table 2.7, Cross-Chapter Box 4.1}						
	•	There is very high likelihood that under of pledges until 2030, global warming will a and remain above that level even in 2100 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 2.5.1}	reach 1.5°C above preindustrial levels by	y mid-century				
		The transition and adaptation to a world is be realized by upscaling and accelerating level and cross-sectoral climate mitigation development initiatives (<i>high agreement</i> , Box 4.1, 4.2.1, 4.4}	the implementation of rapid, far-reaching and adaptation actions, integrated with	ng, multi- n sustainable				
		Delaying actions to reduce greenhouse gastranded assets, job losses, and reduced f long-term. These may increase uneven distages of development (<i>medium evidence</i>)	lexibility in future response options in the stributional impacts between countries a	e medium to				
		To strengthen implementation of the glob raise their level of ambition, shift financi in governance, address equity across and capacities, including traditional knowled 4.4.2, 4.4.6}	al flows and investment patterns, improvibetween generations and regions, and st	ve coherence rengthen				
26		4.2 Energy transitions in pathways compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5°C by						
27		2100 involve end-use efficiency improvements, reductions in energy demand, a rapidly						
28 29	-	growing share of renewable energy and other low carbon energy supplies, and electrification of end-use. These changes also occur in 2°C scenarios, but each element of						
30	the energy transition occurs more rapidly and at a greater scale in 1.5°C scenarios. {2.3.3,							
31	2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.5, 4.3.2, 2.4.3, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.2}							
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47	•	Energy transitions are currently taking pl but at a slower pace in energy-intensive i <i>medium evidence</i>). {4.3.2, 4.3.5, 4.3.2}	, e	,				
	•	Final energy demand in 2100 is generally available 1.5°C scenarios. However, energy strong growth in economic output until the to more sustainable energy, material and	gy demand lower than present day, toge the end of the century, is found in scenari	ther with os with shifts				
	•	Large reductions of per capita energy der elements of 1.5°C scenarios. These are ac appliances, industrial processes, insulation decreases in per capita livestock demand waste and deforestation. <i>(medium confide</i>)	ccompanied by increased efficiency in er on, lighter vehicles, etc.) and often by sul , demand for private vehicle transportation	nd uses (e.g. bstantial				

	Secto		Changes by 2050 compared to 2 in Chapter 2		Decreased energy use compared to the reference scenario	Decreased energy use compared to a 2ºC pathway	
 (medium confidence). {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5, 4.4.3} The choice of the portfolio of mitigation options and the policy instruments that are used for implementation will largely determine the overall synergies and trade-offs of 1.5°C mitigation pathways for sustainable development (very high confidence) (Figure SPM5) {5.4.1,5.4.3, Figure 5.4.1, 5.4.2}. 					ffs of 1.5°C mitigation		
	• A broad portfolio of different mitigation policy options, including carbon pricing mechanisms and regulation, would be necessary in 1.5°C pathways to achieve the most cost-effective emissions reductions <i>(high confidence)</i> . Reduction in energy demand can also be achieved through behaviour change. Discounted carbon prices for limiting warming to 1.5°C are three to seven times higher compared to 2°C, depending on models and socioeconomic assumptions						
		• Coal use would be phased out rapidly in most 1.5°C pathways with annual reduction rates of 4-5%. In pathways where coal use is not entirely phased out by 2050, it is combined with carbon capture and storage and there is virtually no unabated coal use. Most 1.5°C pathways indicate slowly declining use of oil, and a wide range of natural gas use with varying levels of carbon capture and storage.					
• The share of primary energy from renewables increases rapidly in most 1.5°C pathways, with renewables becoming the dominant source by 2050. Low-carbon energy, which includes renewable energy, sustainable biomass and nuclear, supplies on average about one third (15-87% full scenario range) of primary energy in 2030 and on average about two thirds (36-97% range) in 2050.							
	• 1.5°C scenarios include rapid electrification of energy end use (about two thirds of final energy by 2100), and rapid decreases in the carbon intensity of electricity and of remaining fossil fuel use <i>(high confidence)</i> . The electricity sector is fully decarbonized by mid-century in both 1.5°C and 2°C pathways. Additional emissions reductions compared to 2°C pathways come predominantly from energy end use sectors (transport, buildings, industry). {2.3.3}						
Fii	rst Ord	er Dra	ft	SI	РМ	IPCC SR1.5	

	in Chapter 2	compared to the reference scenario	compared to a 2ºC pathway
Transport	[22%] increase in final energy use [36%] share of low-emission energy (electricity, hydrogen, biofuels)	[39%]	[17%]
Buildings	[20%] reduction in final direct energy use [60% electrification	[22%]	[8%]
Industry	 [16%] increase in final energy use [86%] reduction coal use [36%] electrification 0.8-1.8 GtCO₂ avoided yr⁻¹ by CCS (median: 1.5) 	[28%]	[20%]
Electricity	Almost zero-emission by 2050 (some coal/gas with CCS still allowed)	Not Available	Not Available

32 34 35

31

Note: Sectoral changes are based on the median across the range of assessed pathways

33

[Place holder] Sectoral changes by 2050 consistent with 1.5°C pathways based on section Table SPM 2: 2.4. Increasing energy use in end-use sectors is due to higher activity levels. The columns "Decreased energy used compared to REF" and "Decreased energy use compared to a 2°C

First Order Draft SPM IPCC SR1.5 1 2 pathway" indicate that considerable cuts in energy use would be made compared to the reference scenario and to a 2°C scenario. {Table 4.1} 3 4 4.3 Pathways compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5°C by 2100 involve land 5 transitions that imply increasing use of land for sustainable bioenergy production and 6 carbon storage. There is also a need for large volumes of sub-surface carbon storage. 7 Land use mitigation and adaptation options are interlinked with regional climate, food 8 systems, dietary patterns, forest management, regional climate, biodiversity, ecosystems 9 service provision and the Sustainable Development Goals. {Chapter 3, 3.7.2.1, 4.3.3, 4.3.6, 4.3.8, 10 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1.2, 5.4.1.5} 11 12 Global and regional land-use and ecosystem transitions in 1.5°C pathways lead to impacts on • 13 agricultural and natural resource-dependent livelihoods (medium agreement, medium 14 evidence). If not managed carefully, significant changes in agriculture and forest systems risk 15 weakening ecosystem health, leading to food, water and livelihood security challenges, 16 reducing social and environmental feasibility of land-use related mitigation options. {Chapter 17 3, 4.3.3, 4.3.8, 4.5.318 19 Land use is an important driver of regional climate. Biophysical climate feedbacks of land use • 20 change are not considered in the development of the socio-economic pathways. {3.7.2.1} 21 22 Agriculture, forestry and other land use mitigation options that take into account local • 23 people's needs, biodiversity and other sustainable development concerns provide large 24 synergies with Sustainable Development Goals particularly within rural areas of developing 25 countries (*high confidence*). {5.4.1.2, 5.4.1.5} 26 27 Changing agricultural practices using principles of conservation agriculture, efficient • 28 irrigation, and mixed crop-livestock systems are effective adaptation strategies. Behavioural 29 change around diets would reduce emissions and pressure on land. {4.3.3, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3} 30 31 Several overarching adaptation options that are closely linked to sustainable development can • 32 be implemented across rural landscapes, such as investing in health, social safety nets, and 33 insurance for risk management, or disaster risk management and education-based adaptation 34 options. {4.3.6, 4.5.3} 35 4.4 Limiting global warming of 1.5°C implies the need for transformational adaptation 36 37 and mitigation, behaviour change, and multi-level governance. The implementation of 38 far reaching measures is limited by institutional and innovation capabilities. {1.4, 2.3.4, 2.4, 39 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.4, 5.4.1, 5.4.1.3, 5.6.4 40 41 The feasibility of limiting warming to 1.5°C in this report is addressed by considering the • 42 capacity to achieve a specific goal or target, requiring the integration of natural system 43 considerations into the human system scenarios, the placement of technical transformations 44 into their political, social, and institutional context. {4.5.4} 45 46 • Public and formal institutional and innovation capabilities are a limiting factor almost 47 everywhere around the world, particularly in Least Developed Countries and and among


First Order Draft

SPM

populations facing multidimensional poverty, persistent inequalities, and high vulnerabilities. This results in a scarcity of the critical mass of actors needed for the implementation of far reaching measures (*high agreement, medium evidence*). {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, case studies in 4.4, 5.6.4}

- Economies dependent upon fossil fuel-based energy generation and/or export revenue will be affected by the reduced use of fossil fuels necessary to meet ambitious climate goals, despite multiple other sustainable development benefits. There is a need for supplementary policies, including retraining, to ease job losses and the effects of higher energy prices, when they occur, particularly in developing countries where the workforce is largely semi- or unskilled (*very high confidence*) {5.4.1.3}.
- A broad portfolio of different mitigation policy options, including carbon pricing mechanisms and regulation, information provision and technological and infrastructural changes are necessary in 1.5°C pathways to achieve the most cost-effective emissions reductions (*high confidence*). {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.5}
- Packages of policy instruments targeting key factors enabling and promoting change, working across governance levels and promoting innovation, are needed to implement a rapid and far-reaching response *(medium agreement, medium evidence)*. Policy instruments, both price and non-price, are needed to accelerate the deployment of carbon-neutral technologies. Evidence and theory suggests that some form of carbon pricing can be necessary but insufficient in isolation *(medium agreement)*. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}
- Transitioning from climate change mitigation and adaptation planning to practical implementation is a major challenge in constraining global temperature to 1.5°C. Barriers include finance, information, technology, public attitudes, special interests, political will, social values and practices and human resource constraints plus institutional capacity to strategically deploy available knowledge and resources. {1.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.3}
- Policy and finance actors may find their actions to limit warming to below 1.5°C more costeffective and acceptable if multiple factors affecting behaviour are considered (*high agreement, medium evidence*). Behaviour- and lifestyle-related measures have led to limited emission reductions and have promoted effective adaptation behaviour around the world (*high confidence*). {2.3.4, 2.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.4}
- Mitigation actions in the energy demand sectors and behavioural response options with appropriate management of rebound effects can advance multiple Sustainable Development Goals simultaneously, more so than energy supply side mitigation actions (*very high confidence*). (Figure SPM5) {5.4.1, Table 5.1 a-c, Figure 5.4.1}
- Multi-level governance in a 1.5°C warmer world can create an enabling environment for mitigation and adaptation options, behavioural change, policy instruments and innovation, and be aligned with the political economy of both adaptation and mitigation (*medium agreement, medium evidence*). However, power asymmetries undermine the rights, values, and priorities of disadvantaged populations in decision making (*high confidence*). {4.4, 4.4.1, 5.5, 5.6}

	First O	rder Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1	4.5 Pa	thways that are consiste	ent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C	target energy
2	efficie	ency and demand provid	e strong synergies between sustainable d	evelopment and
3	mitiga	ation actions. These action	ons can bring high synergies for water an	d air quality,
4	public	e health, and terrestrial a	and marine ecosystems. The risks for pov	verty, hunger and
5	energ	y access of mitigation me	easures can be alleviated by redistributiv	e measures. {2.3,
6	2.5, 4.3.	7, Boxes 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, 5.4.1, 5	.4.1.3, 5.4.1.4, 5.4.1.5, 5.4.2, 5.4.2.2, 5.4.3}	
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	•	synergies with Sustainable organisations based on the dematerialisation, and mul <i>evidence, high agreement</i>)	Perge from cross-sectoral efforts at city scale shows be Development Goal, as well as those emerging circular economy concept such as zero waste, of ti-policy interventions following systemic appr . {Boxes 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, 5.4.1.4}.	from new sectoral decarbonisation and oaches <i>(medium</i>
	•	such as methane, black can sustainable development in reducing sulphates and oth	warming to 1.5°C with options to reduce short-l rbon and short-lived hydrofluorocarbons, have on terms of health through the prevention of air p her cooling air pollutants comes with trade-offs SPM6) {2.3, 2.5, 4.3.7, 5.4.1.5}	co-benefits for ollution. However,
	•	pronounced positive effect confidence), though increa affect poor and indigenous	warming to 1.5°C that feature very low energy of ts across multiple Sustainable Development Goused risk of sustainable development trade-offs, s populations. They assume radical socio-culture ate challenges for social acceptability. (Figure S 2.2, Table 5.1}	als (<i>very high</i> notably those that al and organizational
	•	with 1.5°C warming and a	res can reduce trade-offs between mitigation op chieving sustainable development and the Susta 5.4.1, 5.4.3, Figure 5.4.1, 5.4.2}	1



Interactions of individual mitigation measures and alternative mitigation portfolios for 1.5°C with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The assessment of interactions between mitigation measures and individual SDGs {5.4}.⁶


Total pages: 31


⁶ Proxy indicators are: 1) Compound annual growth rate of primary energy (PE) to final energy (FE) conversion from 2020 to 2050; 2) % change in FE between 2010 and 2050; 3) Year-2050 across intensity of FE; 4) Year-2050 PE that is non-bio RE; 5) Year-2050 PE from biomass; 6) Year-2050 PE from nuclear; 7) Year-2050 GtCO₂ BECCS; 8) Year-2050 GtCO₂ Fossil-CCS; 9) Year-2050 share of non-livestock in food energy supply; 10) Cumulative CO₂ AFOLU over 2020-2100 period; 11) CH₄ and N₂O AFOLU emissions per unit of total food energy supply; 12) Change in global forest area between 2020 and 2050. Values of Indicators 2, 3, and 11 are inverse related with the deployment of the respective measures. The scenario values are displayed on a relative scale from zero to one where the lowest scenario is set to the origin and the values of the other indicators scaled so that the maximum is one.

	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
$\begin{array}{c}1\\1\\2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\23\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\22\\23\\24\\25\\27\\28\\9\\30\\132\\33\\4\\5\\37\\38\\9\\40\\142\\43\\44\\5\end{array}$	sustainable development ecosystems. Adaptation world, but adaptation lin	nerability through adaptation is mostly s , especially those associated with agricult needs will be lower in a 1.5°C as compare nits are expected to be exceeded in multip l {Chapter 3; 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.6, 4.5.1, 5.2.3, 5.3.2, 5.6.3}	cure, health and ed to a 2°C warmer ple systems and regions
	adaptation and resul warming (<i>medium co</i> Developing States. V warming conditions, regions in a 1.5°C w	Il be lower in a 1.5°C as compared to a 2°C wa ting losses to lives, livelihoods and infrastructur <i>onfidence</i>), with place-specific implications, for While transformational adaptation is necessary u , adaptation limits are expected to be exceeded in armer world, putting large numbers of poor and at risk (<i>medium evidence</i>) {Chapter 3; 4.4.1, 4.	re exist at every level of example for Small Islands under current (~1°C) in multiple systems and I vulnerable people,
	development in gene confidence). Some a some Sustainable De to achieve sustainab	Inerability through adaptation is mostly synergi- eral, and the Sustainable Development Goals sp daptation strategies result in trade-offs and mak evelopment Goals <i>(high confidence)</i> . Transform le development in a 1.5°C warmer world needs al causes of vulnerability <i>(high confidence)</i> . {5.	ecifically <i>(high</i> te it more difficult to meet to adaptation required to address the root socio-
	without increased finance measures will require me 2°C. Financial and techn	adaptation to global warming of 1.5°C be e and the active involvement of the finan- ore investment than today, but less than f cological support is needed to build capac ulti-level governance in many countries.	cial sector. Adaptation for global warming of ity for effective
	 Adaptation to global of the financial sector investments compar- capacity building at 	ance has increased, weakness in distribution an ential impact. {Chapter 3, 4.4.6, 4.5.1} warming of 1.5°C would be unattainable without or, including central and multilateral banks, as fi ed to current actions is unavoidable. This requir multiple levels to handle both climate and trans I sector in all countries. (<i>medium agreement, me</i>	but the active involvement ront-loading of res significant institutional ition risks in the
	sustainable climate smar food waste, and sustaina	gation measures relating to the design and rt agriculture, shifts to sustainable and he ble and climate smart forest managemen rge potential synergies with the Sustainab 1.1.2, 5.4.1.5, 5.4.3}	ealthy diets, reduced t are cost-effective. In
		on and mitigation options can increase cost effe a challenge, for example, for agroforestry, ecosy	

	First Order Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5			
1 2 3	efficient food production, affo {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3}	prestation and reforestation (medium ag	greement) (Box SPM 2).			
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	• Sustainable and climate-smart land/agricultural management, the shift toward sustainable and healthy diets and reduction of food waste and climate-smart sustainable forest management provide cost-effective measures and in many cases, CO ₂ removal. Their design and implementation that take into account local people's needs, biodiversity and other sustainable development concerns provide large synergies with Sustainable Development Goals particularly within rural areas of developing countries. However, climate-smart agriculture can be biased towards technological solutions and ignore (gender) inequalities (Figure SPM7) <i>(high confidence).</i> {5.4.1.2, 5.4.1.5}					
13 14 15 16		eld the poor or redistribute the burden ansfers, food subsidies and improveme 4.4.5, 5.4.3, Figure 5.4.2}				
17	4.9 Climate-resilient developmen	t pathways aim to simultaneously	y meet the Sustainable			
18	Development Goals, strive for lov	w-carbon societies, and limit glob	al warming to 1.5°C,			
19	within the frame of equity and w	ell-being for all. The potential for	r successfully pursuing			
20		ntry's development status and on	÷			
21	communities, institutions, and organisations to adapt and to mitigate, and hence differs					
22	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	poorer nations. {1.4.1, 2.4.3, 2.5.2, 2.5.	3, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.5.1, 4.4.6, Box			
23	4.6, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.6.2	2, 5.6.3, 5.6.4}				
24 25 26 27 28	sustainable energy, material a be achieved together with stro	cies that focus on sustainable developm nd food consumption patterns, and low ong growth in economic output until th (Figure SPM7) {2.4.3, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}	ver energy demand could			
29 30 31 32 33	development approaches to de	pproaches between mitigation, adaptat eliver triple-wins depends on several e ement). {4.4.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.1, 5.5.2	nabling conditions			
34 35 36 37		icies each have the potential for profou onsiderations of the complex local-nat gical systems. {1.4.1, 4.4.5}				
38 39 40 41 42 43	global warming to 1.5°C and inequalities related to equity i vulnerability, such that the wo	ate change depend upon the condition adapting to 1.5°C can be achieved. The mpacts: in the contributions to the pro- porst impacts may fall on those that are erations; and in the power to implement	ere are three key blem; in impacts and least responsible for the			
44 45 46 47 48	nations and regions (very high	ient development pathways differs bet <i>a confidence</i>), given different levels of d capacities to cut emissions, eradicate s. {5.6.2, 5.6.3}	development as well as			
	Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute	SPM-27	Total pages: 31			

	First Or	der Draft	SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6	•	Community-led and bottom-up approaches pathways at scale. At level of individuals, c social inclusion, equity, and human rights h evidence; high agreement). {Box 4.6, 4.4.1	communities, and groups, emphasis on helps to overcome limitations in capacit	well-being,
7 8 9 10 11 12	•	Participatory multi-level governance and its enable transformative social change in a 1.3 dominant pathways and entrenched power of values, and priorities of disadvantaged pope {4.4.1, 5.6.4}	5°C compatible development pathway. differentials continue to undermine the	Yet, rights,
12 13 14 15 16	•	Very limited indicators and monitoring and level progress toward equitable, fair, and so <i>confidence</i>). {4.5.1, 5.6.4}		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	•	Examples from around the world illustrate healthy societies are possible. At the same or communities are truly in line with 1.5°C reduction options via interconnected value capabilities are necessary (<i>medium agreeme</i> 4.4.2, 4.4.6}	time, very few cities, regions, countries . Increased ambition, connecting emiss chains and multi-level governance, and	s, businesses ion l enhanced








Figure SPM 7:

Synergies and trade-offs between mitigation options and sustainable development goals. Top three wheels are representing synergies and bottom three wheels show trade-offs. Colours on the border of the wheels correspond to the Sustainble Development Goals (SDGs) listed above. Here SDG 13 climate action is at the centre because the figure shows if mitigation actions (climate action) in various sectors are taken then what do they interact with the 16 SDGs. Vertically, starting from the first left side, pairs of wheels correspond to synergies (Top) and trade-offs (Bottom) of three mitigation actions undertaken in each of the energy demand sectors (Industry, Residential and Transport sectors). Middle pair of wheels vertically shows the synergies (Top) and tradeoffs (Bottom) with SDGs of the five mitigation actions taken in the energy supply sector. Right most pair, shows synergies (top) and tradeoffs (bottom) with SDGs of three types of mitigation actions in each of the sectors Agriculure, Forestry and Oceans. Length of the coloured bars show the strength of the synergies or tradeoffs. Longer the bar higher is the strength. Shade of the color represent level of confidence based on evidence and agreement in the literature. Darker the shade higher is the confidence and lighter the shade confidence level is lower. White within wheels show no interaction between the corresponding mitigation action sand the SDG, grey within the wheels show knowledge gap. Bottom panel shows various mitigation actions in each sector and corresponding symbols.

123456789011112131451617189202122

SPM-30

	Firs	t Order Draft		SPM	IPCC SR1.5
1	Boz	x SPM 2:	Cities and global warming of 1.	5°C	
2					
			Rapid, systemic transitions in u		al element of an
4	acc	elerated tra	insition to a 1.5°C world. {1.1, 1	.41, 4.3, 4.3.7, 5.4.1.4, Box 5.1}	
5 6	_	Such door	structural shares are he such le	d hidl il	interneted using of
7	•	· ·	structural changes can be enable and adaptation measures, facilita		
8			vernments, and aligned with sus		
9			s in enabling technologies can co		
10			age technologies and general-pu		
11		•••	tion technologies and artificial i	· ·	
12			-		
13	•	Limiting gl	obal warming to 1.5°C is associa	ated with an opportunity for	innovative global, national
14			onal governance, enhancing ada		
15			development, and linked with g	•	
16		decoupling	of economic growth from green	house gas emissions. {1.1,1	.4.1}
17					
18	•		r economy concept such as zero	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
19 20		high synerg	gies with sustainable developmer	it goals {Box $5.1, 5.4.1.4, 4$.3}
	Bo	- SPM 2 2 F	Each additional level of global	varming increases risks to	urban aroos and futura
			epend on vulnerabilities (locati		
23			acities {3.2.1, 3.3, 3.3.2, 3.3.12, 3.4.8		
24		eptution cup	(0.2.1, 0.0, 0.0.2, 0.0.12, 0.1.	, cross chapter Dox 5.2, 1.5, 5.1	
25	•	An addition	nal 0.5°C of warming increases r	isks to urban areas. For example	mple, under a mid-range
26			growth scenario, more than 350		
27		by 2050 in	mega-cities with 1.5°C of global	warming. {3.2.1, 3.3, Cros	s-Chapter Box 3.2}
28					
29	•	•	f 2°C poses greater risks to urba	•	
30			vulnerability of location (coastal		cture sectors (energy,
31		water, trans	sport), and by levels of poverty.	{3.3.2, 3.3.12, 3.4.8}	
32					
33	•	-	thways, all end-use sectors, such	× ///	
34			ctor, require significant demand	reductions by 2030, beyond	those projected for 2°C
35 36		pathways.	{Box 5.1, 5.4.1.3, 4.3}		
30 37	Bo	• SPM 2 3 (Combining adaptation and mit	action options can increase	sa cast affactivanass but
38			o scale up remains a challenge.		se cost enectiveness, but
39	une	potentiai ti	, seare up remains a chancinge.	(1.5.5, 1.5.7, 1.7.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.5)	
40	•	Examples i	nclude land-use planning, urban	planning and urban design	(medium agreement) [.]
41		·	ng building codes and standards		
42		^	. Sustainable water management	0.	•
43		<i>v</i>	structure (medium evidence, high		,
44			ntal services and support urban a		
45		^	lements for fostering urban clim		00
46			overnance, finance and social and		
47		objectives a	and timings, even if multiple ben	efits are achieved {4.3.3; 4.	3.4; 4.4.1; 4.5.2; 4.5.3}
48					